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1THE LIMITS OF ANTICOLONIALISM: THE BRITISH LABOUR MOVEMENT AND
THE END OF EMPIRE IN GUIANA
The Labour MP, Tom Driberg, was not noted for his circumspection but when he composed
the introduction to Cheddi Jagan’s indictment of British colonial policy in Guiana, Forbidden
Freedom, he chose his words very carefully. For Labour politicians, who were ostensibly
committed to anticolonialism, it ought to have been a straightforward matter to condemn the
Conservative Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttelton, who had ordered the dismissal of Jagan
133 days after he had been elected Chief Minister by the Guianese people on 27 April 1953.
The case against Lyttelton gathered additional force when it transpired that the pretext he had
offered, that Jagan’s supporters were planning to burn down the capital, Georgetown, rested
on the flimsiest evidence. Yet these circumstances did not alter the belief of many key figures
in the British labour movement that Jagan was a pro-Soviet stooge who was responsible for
his own downfall. With an eye to these controversies, Driberg thought it prudent to suggest
that the previous Attlee government had ‘shown the sincerity of its anti-imperialism by its
actions in India and Burma and the Gold Coast’, while also acknowledging that Labour’s
response to the crisis in Guiana had been ‘qualified and cautious’. Of the text and author he
was introducing, Driberg noted: ‘I cannot myself endorse every word of Cheddi Jagan’s
book; but I met him more than once in London and learned to respect and like him for his
obvious sincerity, his modesty and his quiet unembittered wit.’i The explanation for Driberg’s
unexpected ambivalence can be found in divisions within the wider Labour movement
between Bevanites and Gaitskellites and these disagreements necessitate reconsideration of
the forces which shaped Labour’s colonial policy. The reason the radical critique of
imperialism offered by the Labour left in the post-war years never became official policy was
because the revisionist right prioritised Atlanticism and anti-communism. Furthermore, the
ascendancy of the revisionists on colonial matters was facilitated by the support they received
from the British Trades Union Congress (TUC), whose role in decolonisation has been
underappreciated by historians. Such considerations were still operating in 1964 when
Wilson’s Labour government implemented a plan devised by another Conservative Colonial
Secretary, Duncan Sandys, with the aim, once again, of securing Jagan’s removal as Chief
Minister of British Guiana.
2The secondary literature on the Labour Party’s relations with nationalist groups in the
periphery, the role of trade unions in the Cold War and the Atlanticist instincts of the Party’s
revisionists offer useful context for an examination of Jagan’s downfall. Existing
interpretations of the development of Labour’s colonial policy during the opposition years of
the 1950s and early 1960s tend to portray it as a period during which the party carved out a
singular and effective critique of late imperial Conservative policy. The Suez crisis, the Hola
camp massacres in Kenya and the Devlin report’s exposure of the problems of the Central
African Federation, offered Labour the opportunity to distinguish their progressive ideas from
those of their reactionary opponents.ii By contrast, the reluctant bipartisanship which
prevailed when Guianese affairs were debated in 1953 and 1964 demonstrates the limits of
the metropolitan left’s anticolonialism. The precedents for Labour’s hostility to Jagan can be
found in the suspicion of anticolonial nationalism which prevailed for much of the party’s
first half century. In his work on the party’s Indian policy, Owen illustrated the tendency of
British Labour to adopt a paternal rather than fraternal attitude towards Indian nationalism.
The purported waywardness of their anticolonial charges often threatened complete
estrangement, most notably during the Quit India campaign of the Second World War.iii
In the case of Guiana, Jagan’s room for manoeuvre was restricted still further by the TUC’s
embroilment in the Cold War. In 1949 British trade unions played a pivotal role in the
establishment of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) as a rival to
the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), which dominated trade unionism in the
eastern bloc. During the 1950s the ICFTU’s anti-Soviet remit required both the appeasement
of anti-communists in the colonial periphery and a relentless assault on those whose
sympathies appeared to reside with Moscow. Waters and Ramcharan have focused on Guiana
as one of the key battlegrounds in this conflict.iv What has not been forthcoming has been any
analysis of what these conflicts tell us about the nature of debates within the metropolitan
labour movement about colonial policy. Whereas the attitude of Labour’s revisionists to
Atlanticism has been thoroughly investigated by Black among others, only Stephen Howe has
engaged in any detail with the question of how the left interpreted the rise of anticolonial
sentiment in the colonies in the post-1945 period.v The internal conflicts endured by the
Labour Party during the 1950s have also been chronicled in great detail by the participants,
but the attitudes of the protagonists to colonial affairs and the role of international labour
diplomacy are rarely mentioned in these accounts.vi Gupta’s forty-year old monograph is
3probably still the most comprehensive overview of the wider Labour movement’s
engagement with imperialism but he casts the role of the TUC to the margins and, in
analysing British Guiana, focuses on the impact of those British trade unions who expressed
sympathy for colonial liberation.vii
The institutional focus of this analysis leans towards traditional historical methodology but
the emphasis on non-state institutions places it outside the narrow sphere of diplomatic
history and borrows from the transnational approach to labour history, which has been
pioneered by van der Linden.viii Two powerful national labour confederations, in the form of
the British TUC and the American Federation of Labor- Congress of Industrial Organizations
(AFL-CIO), alongside international labour organisations, such as the ICFTU, exercised
influence over the fate of British Guiana. An examination of the records of these
organisations and the Labour Party reveals that, although labour diplomacy was conducted in
close relations with the state, it had a measure of autonomy which justifies extending the
analytical purview beyond national governments. From the Guianese perspective Jagan’s
cultivation of liberationist figures from the British metropolitan left, most notably the
Movement for Colonial Freedom, also demonstrates the importance which local nationalists
accorded to a form of politics which fell outside the sphere of state-to-state international
diplomacy. However, as the story of Driberg’s introduction to Forbidden Freedom suggests,
these forms of transnational association were always precarious and often ineffectual.
Guianese affairs did not float free from national contexts and the particular traditions forged
within the nation state are relevant. It was the inherent inequality of the colonial relationship
which enabled British Labour to impose solutions which reflected their priorities on to the
Guianese labour scene, which had been developing its own traditions before the decisive
intervention of 1953. Labour’s paternalism in dealing with anticolonial nationalists, the
militantly anti-Soviet line of the British TUC and tensions between liberationists and
Atlanticists within the parliamentary party mark a distinctive national tradition. British social
democrats tended to interpret colonial affairs through the lens of metropolitan and
international conflicts rather than in terms of global processes of colonial liberation. Despite
these caveats the late British empire provide a fertile field from which historians can respond
to the emphasis which Price has given, in his gloss on a recent essay by van der Linden, to
‘the importance of understanding that the local patterns and structures of labour’s experience
are locked into national and international networks.’ix
4THE GUIANESE CRISIS OF 1953: MILITARY INTERVENTION,
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND ANTI-COMMUNISM
Although Guiana occupies a marginal position in histories of British imperialism, its workers
played a pioneering role in the organisation of labour within the empire. From the outset
protests about conditions of employment were tied to wider political grievances. In 1905,
under the leadership of the 21 year-old Hubert Critchlow, Guianese dockworkers organised a
strike which developed into a wider rebellion against colonial authority. Critchlow was later
responsible for the registration of the British Guiana Labour Union (BGLU) in 1922, a year
after the passage by the local legislature of an enabling trade union ordinance. During the
interwar period he solicited support from Labour party politicians interested in colonial
affairs, including Frederick O. Roberts, who was a minister in MacDonald’s first short-lived
government and Arthur Creech Jones, who founded the Fabian Colonial Bureau (FCB) in
1940.x Enlisting sympathetic politicians in the imperial metropolis was a means by which
activists in the periphery could circumvent the conservatism of the local elites who comprised
Georgetown professionals and plantation owners. From the perspective of the metropolitan
left, the cultivation of leaders like Critchlow, who as he entered middle age became
increasingly sympathetic to British imperialism, was regarded as a means to channel labour
unrest.
In contrast to British conditions, labour radicalism in Guiana had an agrarian rather than an
industrial tinge. The country had its dockworkers, its civil servants, its taxi drivers, its
shopworkers and even its miners in the bauxite industry, but those who endured some of the
worst labour conditions were the very large class of plantation workers. During the inter-war
period incremental reforms were implemented against a background of enduring socio-
economic stagnation in rural areas. Violence on the plantations was common and in the late
1930s a strike on the Leonora Estate in Demerara developed into a wider insurrection. In the
aftermath of the rebellion, responsibility for organising agrarian labour fell to the Manpower
Citizens Association (MPCA) which was registered in 1937. From the perspective of the
Colonial Office, it was the duty of the MPCA and its leader Ayube Edun to curb anticolonial
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somewhat eccentric figure whose ambition was to establish what he called the Rational-
Practical-Ideal state which would feature amongst its institutions a Supreme Council of
Intelligentsia.xi The assertion of more mundane demands for improved conditions on the
estates elicited hostility from the Sugar Producers’ Association but, the meliorism of the
MPCA attracted the patronage of the Colonial Office and the Labour Party. By the early
1950s conditions on the sugar estates were still characterised by hopelessly inadequate
housing, low wages and the looming threat of punitive action by employers against trade
unionists. Even conservative Colonial Office figures recognised the limits of what had been
achieved by incremental reform. Stephen Luke, who visited Guiana during the controversies
of 1953, reported that although ‘local employers remained old fashioned in their approach to
labour problems, they have done much to improve the conditions of labour but much remains
to be done. Some of the housing on the estates for instance is very bad indeed.’xii
By this point the influence of Critchlow and Edun was being superseded by a new generation
of radicals with a new critique which drew on a Leninist analysis of the relationship between
colonialism and global capitalism. In temperament they were sceptical about incremental
reform, in method they were conscious of the need to unite industrial and political struggle
and in ambition they desired a radical rebalancing of relations between overseas capital and
indigenous labour. The first into the field was Joseph Prayal Lachmansingh who found the
Guiana Industrial Workers Union (GIWU) in 1946. Despite its name GIWU aimed to
displace the MPCA on the sugar estates and the struggle over the right to represent these
workers would dominate Guianese industrial relations for the next two decades. A precedent
for future violence was established in 1948 when five supporters of a GIWU-organised strike
were shot and killed by armed policemen at Enmore. By this stage the industrial movement
had acquired a political wing in the form of Cheddi Jagan’s Political Affairs Committee,
which became a fully-fledged party on 1 January 1950. Jagan had read Marx’s Capital while
undertaking training in dentistry in the United States. He stated that it ‘was later to open up
whole new horizons’; at the time it provided a point of ideological concordance with his
American wife, Janet Rosenberg, who was a member of the American Communist Party.xiii
On his return to Guiana he placed the meliorist politics of reform in a new context:
‘Nationalisation of the sugar industry and indeed of all major industries is our ultimate
objective. In the interim while British Guiana is still tied to British imperialism, with limited
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imperialism.’xiv Jagan’s linking of the economic grievances of workers to political demands
for democratisation and reform of the industrial regime would feature on the charge sheet of
allegations levelled against him after the PPP won the elections of 1953.
Jagan’s initial breach with potential metropolitan sympathisers on the British left was
precipitated by disagreements over constitutional reform, while questions of industrial
relations widened the scope of an established mistrust. Jagan initially followed the precedent
established by Critchlow in seeking support among British progressive opinion, most notably
the Fabian Colonial Bureau. One of the causes taken up by the FCB during Rita Hinden’s
time as Secretary was the Enmore killings and, at Jagan’s request, she arranged for a
parliamentary question to be asked on the subject in July 1948.xv Three years later Hinden,
and the historian, Vincent Harlow, visited Guiana as part of John Waddington’s
Constitutional Commission. Had a Conservative government been in power, it is unlikely that
progressive figures such as Hinden and Harlow would have been appointed and, to that
extent, the Attlee government could claim credit for the democratic reforms suggested by
Waddington. During her visit Hinden established a ‘very friendly’ relationship with Cheddi
and Janet Jagan and arranged to disseminate some of their work on the economic aspects of
imperialism in Britain.xvi Once the commission reported, however, amity was replaced by
deep enmity. As well as proposing the establishment of universal suffrage, the Waddington
Commission recommended offering greater powers to elected members than was available on
the nearby islands of the eastern Caribbean. Six of the ten members of the executive were to
be chosen from the elected members and given portfolios. From Hinden’s perspective this
was a generous package of reform but the PPP objected to the perpetuation of the usual
colonial paraphernalia such as official representation on the executive and the retention of
reserved powers by the Governor, all of which the report endorsed as a means of
safeguarding British interests. Hinden interpreted the PPP’s objections to these features of the
new constitution as evidence of the ‘totalitarian’ instincts of the party’s leaders.
Waddington, Hinden and Harlow did not anticipate that the PPP would win 18 of 24 seats in
the legislature when the first elections under the new constitution were held in 1953. This
success gave Cheddi Jagan, as Chief Minister, a sense of legitimacy but for Hinden, the PPP
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Lyttelton suspended the constitution she had helped devise, Hinden offered some tepid
criticisms of the Conservative government, alongside unqualified condemnation of the PPP
for attempting to establish ‘a “one party” state’ in British Guiana.xvii As editor of the
Gaitskellite journal, Socialist Commentary Hinden was the bureaucratic embodiment of the
affinity between anti-Bevanism and anti-Jaganism and would continue her attacks on the PPP
into the 1960s. Her affiliation with the Gaitskellites was significant because the controversy
over the suspension of the Guianese constitution occurred in the midst of the British Labour
Party’s greatest internal crisis since the split of 1931. Two elements in Guianese affairs
stimulated anti-Jagan feeling among the Gaitkellite wing. Firstly, Jagan’s espousal of
Marxism and the contacts he made with countries in the Soviet bloc had Cold War
implications. According to intelligence reports Cheddi Jagan was reported to have met Czech
officials in Prague during the summer of 1951 and Janet Jagan travelled to Rumania two
years later. Both were also overheard by the devices of the Security Service when they visited
the headquarters of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB).xviii For the Gaitskellites,
scrupulous monitoring of Britain’s colonies for the potential emergence of communist
influence was the colonial counterpart of their sponsorship of NATO in Europe. This factor
became more significant once Washington declared that Guiana was a test case for Labour’s
reliability as a Cold War ally; more pressing in 1953 was the perception among British trade
unions that the PPP was promoting the interests of the nascent GIWU at the expense of the
MPCA. One of the six new PPP ministers was Lachmansingh who was identified, along with
Cheddi Jagan and Sydney King, as one of three ‘Extreme Left Wing’ ministers. Their attempt
to introduce a Labour Relations Bill which would have enabled GIWU penetration of MPCA
strongholds on the sugar plantations became a defining moment in the conflict between the
colonial administration and elected ministers. Jagan’s argument that the bill was inoffensive
rested on the fact that its contents were modelled on the American Wagner Act and were
actually ‘aimed at minimising inter-union rivalry and preventing jurisdictional disputes.’xix
By contrast, the Governor, Alfred Savage, accused the PPP of exploiting labour unrest and
employing coercion to promote the interests of its allies among the trade unions. During the
course of a strike on the sugar plantations, the leaders of the PPP and GIWU were reported to
have ‘vied with one another in seditious and inflammatory speeches.’xx
8British troops arrived in Guiana just as the Labour Relations Bill was due to be debated in the
Legislative Council. Jagan’s dismissal and the suspension of the constitution prevented its
enactment. Plans to arrest the PPP leaders were never implemented because Savage did not
want to risk alienating moderate opinion in the Colony.xxi Consequently, Jagan was at liberty
to fly to Britain in an attempt to mobilise metropolitan opposition to the constitutional coup.
It was his misfortune that he arrived at a moment when the leaders of the British trade unions
were aligning themselves with the Gaitskellites against the Bevanites. As Barbara Castle
ruefully recalled the ‘naked display of trade union power’ in backing Gaitskell at a succession
of Labour conferences gained the approval of the Tory press: ‘It was not until the big unions
swung left... that the newspapers began writing angry editorials about the iniquity of the
block vote.’xxii British trade union leaders detected parallels between their ongoing conflicts
with communists inside their organisations and industrial relations controversies in Guiana.
The future TUC General Secretary, George Woodcock, described the PPP leaders as ‘mostly,
young, vain and inexperienced’ and, while recognising some differences between individuals,
concluded that ‘the more moderate elements were held firmly in the grip of their communist
colleagues.’xxiii Although the historiography on Bevanism pays scant attention to colonial
affairs, secondary accounts of the Labour Party’s internal conflicts of the 1950s emphasise
that the leaders of the largest metropolitan trade unions were the most strident anti-Bevanites,
while support for Bevan came mainly from constituency parties. To take one example from
the historiography on domestic industrial relations, Jim Phillips has analysed the way in
which Arthur Deakin’s anti-communism was rooted in ongoing conflict with the left in the
Transport and General Workers Union.xxiv On the international front, the TUC cooperated
with the Foreign Office in promoting the ICFTU and portraying the WFTU as a communist
front organisation. After examining the TUC’s relations with the Foreign Office’s clandestine
Information Research Department, Hugh Wilford concluded that ‘a strong corporatist
partnership continued to exist between the right-wing leadership of the labour movement and
the British secret state in what was a joint front against communism in the unions.’xxv
As Britain’s trade union leaders extended their search for left wing infiltrators into the
colonies the rivalry between the WFTU and the ICFTU provided a useful indicator of the
loyalty of colonial unions. Unlike GIWU, the MPCA followed the British precedent by
disaffiliating from the WFTU and joining the ICFTU which had the support of the American
as well as the British labour movement.xxvi Jagan could thus be accused of two counts of
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the interests of GIWU at the expense of the MPCA and he had established a close
relationship with the WFTU’s principal agent in the Anglophone Caribbean, the Jamaican
trade unionist, Ferdinand Smith. These circumstances ensured that he did not receive a
fraternal reception from the leaders of Britain’s trade unions. The current General Secretary
of the TUC, Vincent Tewson informed ICFTU representatives that he was more sympathetic
to Lyttelton’s position than to that of the parliamentary Labour Party and that this might
generate a split between the industrial and political wings on Guiana.xxvii The extent of
hostility to Jagan became evident at a meeting of the National Council of Labour on 22
October, during which the question of his WFTU contacts was aired. Tewson stated bluntly
‘the colonial people were apt to think that there was no danger of communism. They did not
recognise what was actually happening before their eyes.’ Deakin insisted that the WFTU had
already penetrated the Caribbean and ‘imbued the people with communist philosophy.’ The
President of the National Union of Miners, Will Lawther, suggested that communist trade
unionists were utilising ‘stooges’ in the region.xxviii The world view of Tewson, and the
similarly inclined Lawther and Deakin, was predicated on the notion that, in combating
Bevanism at home and the WFTU abroad, they were engaged in the same vital Cold War
work.
On the same day as the NCL meeting Labour MPs vented their differing views on the
Guianese intervention in Parliament. Jagan watched the debate from the public gallery of the
House of Commons and was disheartened by the contributions of Labour’s front bench.xxix
The party’s colonial spokesman James Griffiths quibbled with Lyttelton over his justification
for ousting the PPP, while insisting ‘we stand by democratic parties and the democratic
unions affiliated with the ICFTU.’xxx Having met the PPP leader the day before, Attlee was
more avid in his criticism of Jagan’s government than he was of Churchill’s. He reported: ‘I
have seen the leaders of the PPP and had a considerable talk with them. They did not in any
way disabuse me of the idea that they were behaving extremely unwisely and that they were
either Communists or Communist dupes. However I understand that there are these other
elements, and the important thing is to appeal to those elements.’xxxi Evidence of a division
between Cold Warriors and anticolonialists on Labour’s backbenches could be found in the
contributions of John Hynd and John McGovern. Hynd offered the fewest qualifications in
his defence of the PPP and was the most outspoken critic of Lyttelton’s actions. In examining
10
the justification which Lyttelton had published he concentrated on the parallels between
British domestic politics and colonial affairs: ‘much of this White Paper smells of the usual
political boycott by big capital against this party. It smells of the Tory practice in this
country, the establishment of rival unions and talk of destroying the economy.’xxxii By
contrast, McGovern, who had only recently left the Independent Labour Party, declared ‘Dr.
Jagan and his party are a menace’ and criticised Griffiths for offering insufficient support to
Lyttelton’s efforts to resist communist influence in the colonies.xxxiii
While Jagan’s demands for radical economic change and his connections to the WFTU
ensured that he was shunned by the right of the labour movement, they constituted an
incentive for the various factions on the left to court him. From the moment he entered
Britain he was placed under surveillance by the Security Services. Their investigations
revealed a battle for Jagan’s allegiance between the Bevanites and the Stalinist leadership of
the CPGB. One of the key elements of the Bevanite critique of the Labour leadership was that
they were beholden to an American Cold War agenda and these suspicions gathered force
when Attlee supported Truman’s intervention in the Korean War.xxxiv On the home front the
Bevanites were obliged to defend their left flank against the CPGB. In the pages of Tribune,
the leading Bevanite MP, Ian Mikardo, parodied the influence of late Stalinist paranoia on the
CPGB’s portrayal of the leader of the Labour left: ‘Aneurin Bevan’s real name is Al
Bernstein, an American Jewish financier who speaks in a secret Welsh code.’xxxv All of this
had implications for Jagan whose status as a leading anticolonial radical made him the subject
of a tug of love between the Bevanites and the CPGB which was observed and disdained by
the British security services and the Labour right. An unnamed human source supplied
information on Jagan’s contacts with the Bevanites and the CPGB after he arrived in London.
A party at Bevan’s house was described as ‘the culminating point in a great effort made by
the Beven (sic) Group to do everything possible to “shield” Jagan from the Communist
Party.’xxxvi The two booklets which Jagan wrote to publicise the PPP’s interpretation of
Lyttelton’s actions had prefatory comments by leading Bevanites: Driberg’s qualified
endorsement for Forbidden Freedom followed the precedent set by Jennie Lee, who
performed the same service for a pamphlet issued under the auspices of the Union for
Democratic Control entitled What Happened in British Guiana.xxxvii
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His willingness to be wooed by both Bevanites and Communists did nothing to moderate the
British unions’ hostility to Jagan, while the qualified endorsement of the PPP offered by
figures such as Lee and Driberg were sufficient to rile the Gaitskellites. These effects were
evident when Jagan, Burnham and other Guianese politicians appeared before the NEC’s sub-
committee on Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs on 3 November 1953. Alice Horan of the
National Union of General and Municipal Workers, was particularly dogged and critical
when she quizzed Jagan about his connections to the WFTU. This theme was then taken up
by Tewson who pressed Jagan to explain his relationship with Ferdinand Smith.xxxviii It seems
unlikely that Horan and Tewson would have been quite so well informed about Smith, who
had spent his entire career as a political activist in the United States and was not a well-
known figure in British politics, had they not been directly or indirectly briefed by the
Security Service, who had in their possession a letter Jagan had sent to Smith encouraging the
WFTU to take an interest in colonial territories.xxxix Those with reservations about leashing
the party too firmly to the American Cold War standard resented NEC instructions not to
provide a platform for the PPP leaders. Many constituency parties were inclined towards
Bevanism and 75 protested against the line which the leadership was pursuing on Guiana.xl
Mikardo and Driberg argued that the affair demonstrated the overbearing role of right-wing
trade union leaders in setting the party’s agenda on colonial affairs. In an article for Tribune,
Mikardo registered his surprise that the Conservative Colonial Secretary ‘has found a friend
at last. Thirty friends in fact. To wit the members of the General Council of the TUC.’
Mikardo’s facetiousness led to a furious row. At Tewson’s behest, he was rebuked for writing
the article and for attending a meeting with Jagan in Reading. The passage of an official
motion of censure was highly unusual but was enacted against Mikardo at an NEC meeting
on 16 December 1953. The Times informed its readers that, during the discussions, ‘the
Christmas spirit of good will was noticeably absent’. Evidently they were well informed
because the great chronicler of NEC squabbling, Richard Crossman, confirmed in his diary
that the Guianese controversy had become a proxy for the wider conflict over the proper
limits of TUC influence in the British labour movement: ‘...it was pushed to the normal vote
and Nye made a sensational blow-up at this point, saying they were trying to pick us off one
by one and wouldn’t be successful. “Anyway” he concluded the vote is given by stooges of
the TUC.” To which Alice Horan replied “Well your stooges of the Kremlin”, and when
asked to withdraw, said she would rather die than take back a word of what she believed to be
true. Nye then left the room, I thought to go to the lavatory but in fact it was a walk-out
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though none of us knew it, and he apparently didn’t think it worth staying to deal with the
Egyptian problem when it came up.’xli
The row over Mikardo’s censure came at the height of the conflict between Bevanites and
Gaitskellites and illustrated the numerous and often contradictory factors which influenced
the development of Labour’s colonial policy at this time: the implications for colonial
territories of the conflicts between the WFTU and ICFTU, the ascendancy of anti-
communists at the top of the British trade unions; the countervailing pressures exerted by the
longstanding ties between the Labour party and nationalist activists in the periphery and the
danger that, if the party discontinued this support, a more radical generation of activists
would turn to the Communist Party for assistance. Given that these currents were pulling in
different directions it is perhaps unsurprising that Driberg’s endorsement of Jagan in
Forbidden Freedom was hedged about with caveats. By the time Forbidden Freedom was
published Jagan was in prison and his cause was taken up by two of the organisers of the new
Movement for Colonial Freedom, Fenner Brockway and Jennie Lee.xlii Alongside the
emergency regulations in Kenya and the establishment of the Central African Federation,
events in British Guiana were one of the three issues which provided motive and impetus for
the establishment of the MCF. The new organisation was committed to liberationist politics
and although it contained many Bevanites, its support extended beyond the Labour left. By
the time of Jagan’s return to power in 1957 the left-right split on colonial issues had become
less pronounced but Labour’s internal disagreements over foreign policy issues would
continue to have ramifications for decolonisation. In particular, the increasing interest in
Guianese affairs taken by policymakers in Washington, which occurred at the same time as
the triumph of the revisionists, who were also champions of Atlanticism, provided a further
illustration of the way that the colonial policy of the British Labour Party was distorted by the
exigencies of Cold War fighting at home and abroad.
THE GUIANESE CRISES OF 1962-64: SUBTERFUGE, ELECTORAL REFORM
AND ATLANTICISM
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The second ousting of Cheddi Jagan in 1964 was a consequence partly of external
manipulation, in which British and American trade unionists had a large role, and partly of
the instability of Guianese anticolonial nationalism which was beset by overlapping class and
racial divisions. As Rabe and Palmer have demonstrated Guianese politics became a
preoccupation of the Kennedy and Johnson administrationsxliii Its geographical location on
the American mainland made the political affairs of a colonial country of only half a million
people an urgent priority at a time when Washington was determined to contain the impact of
Castro’s revolution. Once Washington became committed to the removal of the left-wing
PPP government prior to independence, Labour’s revisionists accepted that Jagan had to go.
Although Britain’s labour diplomats did not take on the role of subversives, as their
American counterparts did, and some even expressed concern for the plight of the PPP
government, the TUC again played a significant role in validating the Cold War calculations
of the right of the parliamentary party. After Labour’s 1964 election victory, Jagan’s
sympathisers in the MCF were unable to prevent Wilson’s government from implementing
the plan for electoral reform hatched by the previous Conservative Colonial Secretary,
Duncan Sandys, with the express purpose of ousting Jagan. Any other policy, the revisionists
argued, would tarnish their credentials in Washington. The Sandys plan exploited the fact that
the interests of the sizable urban middle class in Georgetown, who were predominantly
African-Guianese, diverged from those of the predominantly Indian-Guianese plantation
workers whose support for Jagan’s radical anticolonialism enabled the PPP to win victories in
1953, 1957 and 1961. Despite these successes, under the Westminster-style constituency
system which the British introduced in their colonies, the PPP had never obtained support
from 50% of the electorate. The electoral reforms proposed by Sandys and implemented by
Wilson’s government aimed to deny the PPP an absolute majority at the 1964 elections and
facilitate a post-electoral pact between the disparate anti-Jagan forces of Forbes Burnham’s
People’s National Congress (PNC) and Peter d’Aguiar’s United Force (UF).
The scheme rested on the misapprehension that Burnham, who had led the majority of the
Afro-Guianese members of the PPP out of the party in 1955, was a moderate in domestic
affairs and a potential Cold War ally for the West after independence. With encouragement
from anti-communist zealots in the American trade union movement Burnham portrayed
himself as the reliable and pragmatic face of Guianese nationalism. His PNC party adopted a
dual strategy comprising demands for electoral reform on the one hand and popular protest on
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the other. The catalyst for violent opposition was an economic one, namely raising of taxes
and the imposition of capital controls in the PPP’s 1962 budget. American trade unions and
the CIA had been complicit in the disorders which exacerbated racial tensions within the
colony. Once the coalition was in place the American government was expected to end their
efforts to subvert the Guianese government and to offer economic assistance. This in turn
would smooth the path to independence. The Wilson government’s response to these events
was not based solely on internal Labour Party politics; Britain’s financial dependence on the
United States and the requirement not to aggravate the offence caused by differences over
Indochina policy, constituted the crucial financial and diplomatic context. Nevertheless, in
opposition, the Labour Party had criticised the introduction of a new electoral system as an
unprecedented expedient which was likely to aggravate ongoing civil strife in Guiana. By
once more pitching pro-Atlanticists on the right of the party against liberationists on the left,
the question of whether to cancel the Guianese elections reopened controversies about the
directions of the Labour Party’s colonial policy which seemed to have abated since the
suspension of the constitution in 1953.
Jagan believed that he was in a stronger position to rally metropolitan support than he had
been in 1953 and judged that a victory for Labour in the 1964 elections offered the best
opportunity to avoid the introduction of proportional representation. His account of events in
The West on Trial begins by identifying Harold Wilson as a former Bevanite and therefore a
potential ally. In order to emphasise the full extent of the subsequent betrayal, he then
catalogues the public and private criticism of the Sandys formula made by Labour in
opposition.xliv When he returned to power after the 1957 election, Jagan established a modus
vivendi with the colonial administration. During the next four probationary years Jagan’s
reputation was rehabilitated to the extent that the local colonial administration characterised
him as a more plausible leader of an independent Guiana than Burnham who was accused by
the Governor, Ralph Grey, of recklessly stirring up the racial resentments of his supporters.
After Jagan’s third election triumph in 1961 the Macmillan government made plans to make
the country independent in 1962. There were, however, two elements of Jagan’s programme,
which endangered his chances of becoming the first Prime Minister of an independent
country. The first related to his wider ideological position and, in particular, his rhetorical
determination to place colonial subordination within the context of the wider operations of
international capital. It was this which led to accusations that he was, either as Iain Macleod
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suggested to Arthur Schlesinger an ‘LSE Marxist’, or, as Reginald Maudling rather more
crudely put it, an ‘utter fool and bloody bastard’.xlv The sense that he would orientate Guiana
towards the Soviet Union after independence was hardened by the visits he and his wife made
to the eastern bloc. This injudicious ideological positioning left the Jagan’s more vulnerable
than those leftist anticolonialists such as Julius Nyerere in Tanganyika, who were more
careful to distinguish their socialism from the Soviet iteration. Furthermore, unlike Nyerere,
the Jagans were conducting their campaign for independence on the American mainland.
When he visited Washington in October 1961 Cheddi Jagan infuriated Kennedy by making
disobliging remarks about American foreign policy which appeared to echo the increasingly
anti-American tone of Castro’s revolutionaries. From the discussions, Washington
policymakers concluded that he could become the first leader of an independent communist
state on the American mainland. Kennedy’s Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, told Sandys and
Douglas-Home that the administration ‘considered it extremely serious to have another
Marxist regime in the Western hemisphere… If the British Government insisted on granting
independence considerable difficulties might arise.’xlvi The hostility of American unions
became a further factor in Kennedy’s calculations. One familiar item of the PPP programme
attracted particular attention from the ICFTU and the AFL-CIO, namely the reform of
Guianese industrial relations regime which would challenge the domination of the MPCA
among plantation labourers. The relentless pursuit of suspected communists by the legendary
American trade unionist and former leader of the American Communist Party, Jay Lovestone,
extended to British Guiana. Lovestone and his acolytes believed the promotion of nationalist
influence within colonial trade unions such as the MPCA was a useful tactic in repelling
attempts at communist penetration. The details of the AFL-CIO’s Guianese adventures have
been provided elsewhere and one example will suffice to indicate the nature of their
involvement.xlvii When Jagan mobilised his supporters in the renamed Guianese Agricultural
Workers Union (GAWU) against the imposition of proportional representation, Lovestone’s
agent, Gene Meakins, was unembarrassed about the necessity to provide covert funding for
thugs to attack its members. In a letter written from Guiana on 6 March 1964 Meakins argued
that the MPCA strikers were intimidated by the GAWU, which had been formed in 1961 with
support from Jagan’s government. He suggested a solution: ‘it is going to take money to keep
bands of supporters organized throughout the estates to clash with GAWU to show the
workers they need not be afraid. These supporters... would have to be paid to go off the
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job...if it goes on for very long it is my assessment that the MPCA will need some financial
support. It looks as though it going to amount to which side is the toughest with a club and
the club wielders would have to be paid.’xlviii
The TUC resented the meddling of their American counterparts in Britain’s remaining
colonies. Although they were ostensibly part of a united front inside the ICFTU, during the
1950s and 1960s, British and American unions engaged in frequent squabbles over the
question of how best to conduct the Cold War against the Soviet-backed WFTU. British
unions, working in close collaboration with the Colonial Office, maintained that nascent
colonial unions should be non-political and restrict their activities to promoting better pay
and conditions. Consequently they looked askance at AFL-CIO sponsorship of violent anti-
government protests and strikes. American funding and direction were conspicuous first, in
the protests against Jagan’s 1962 budget, which increased taxes on the country’s middle
classes; then, during the strikes in opposition to the industrial relations legislation introduced
by the PPP in 1963; and finally, in rallying support for proportional representation which
Sandys had fabricated with the express purpose of defeating Jagan in the 1964 elections.
According to reports received by the ICFTU ‘there is little doubt that the MPCA could have
continued without heavy financial assistance from the US labour movement.’xlix
The unease generated in the British labour movement by the use of strikes as a political
weapon and the Cold War zealotry of the AFL-CIO was aggravated by doubts about the
probity of their allies inside Guiana, most notably the MPCA, which dated back to the mid-
1950s. At this time the TUC had hoped to reform and strengthen the Guianese industrial
relations framework by offering £3,000 to ‘responsible trade unions’. An official, Andrew
Dalgleish, was despatched to Guiana to advise on organisational matters. Dalgleish reported
in May 1955 ‘I had not been long in Georgetown before complaints were made about the
MPCA’; while George Woodcock who supervised the Dalgleish mission recorded ‘it must be
admitted that the MPCA was weak and in some districts unpopular and the rival GIWU does
undoubtedly possess the support of many sugar workers.’l Seven year later Walter Hood, the
TUC’s agent in British Guiana, again noted the vulnerability of the MPCA to ‘pirate unions’
and suggested that the ‘cancer’ which weakened the union’s defences was the dependence of
its leaders on external subsidies, including from the American unions, rather than fee-paying
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union members.li With encouragement from the Colonial Office, the TUC directed additional
funds towards the MPCA from April 1963 but such assistance became increasingly
contentious once the extent of American encroachment into the country’s affairs became
apparent. Hood complained of the MPCA’s determination ‘to get rid of the Government’.
Robert Willis, who attempted to mediate between the parties on behalf of the TUC, was
shocked by the unwillingness of the MPCA to compromise and even formed a sympathetic
view of Jagan.lii
Despite their criticisms of the irregular conduct of the MPCA and exposure to the subterfuge
in which both the British and American governments were engaged, hostility to Jagan
trumped other considerations in TUC deliberations about reforming Guiana’s electoral
system. The Conservative government initially resisted Washington’s call for Jagan’s
removal and the imposition of direct rule but agreed to postpone independence. This provided
the necessary time for Sandys to devise a system of proportional representation which offered
a means of propitiating Washington while maintaining an appearance of probity and due
process. It also avoiding a repetition of the events of 1953 which would attract further
domestic and international criticism. Although apprehensive about the likely consequences of
American efforts to unseat Jagan, the TUC’s International Office insisted there was ‘no
convincing alternative’ to Sandys’ proposals. Once again the communist affiliations of
Cheddi and Janet Jagan, and their enthusiasm for the Cuban revolution were offered as
justification. The attitude of Harold Wilson’s ally, Frank Cousins, is instructive. His
adventitious rise through the ranks of the TGWU in the 1950s presaged a leftward shift
within British trade unionism which encompassed, in foreign affairs, a greater scepticism
about any blanket endorsement of Atlanticism. Despite his association with anti-revisionism
and the prevailing mistrust of proportional representation in Labour circles, after visiting
Guiana Cousins did not reject the Sandys plan; he argued instead that it was unrealistic to
expect Jagan’s opponents in the Guianese trade union movement not to endorse the novel
electoral system which Sandys had designed to dislodge the PPP.liii
While anti-Jaganism in the industrial wing of the party generated some sympathy for Sandys’
Machiavellian schemes, there was greater resistance to the electoral changes on the political
wing. The singular nature of Sandys’ reforms was one advantage which Jagan’s sympathisers
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among Labour MPs could exploit. The revised Guianese electoral system was based on the
Israeli method of strict proportionality which effectively turned the entire country into one
constituency; it was used nowhere else in the empire and was accompanied by auxiliary,
clandestine measures to embolden the PPP’s opponents and foster the emergence of new
parties.liv In its internal assessment the International Department of the Labour Party
described the introduction of proportional representation as ‘a blatant attempt to tilt the
balance against Jagan’. Arthur Bottomley, who was Labour’s spokesman on Commonwealth
affairs, criticised the Sandys plan.lv Speaking to official at the American embassy on behalf
of the International department, David Ennals warned that Labour would oppose Sandys’
electoral revision on four grounds: it was ‘obviously designed to oust Jagan’, would
exacerbate racial grievances, cause political instability and, finally, would make Jagan ‘more
receptive to extremist advice.’lvi In this spirit, during the first half of 1964, the founding
father of the MCF, Fenner Brockway, bombarded Sandys with Parliamentary questions about
Guianese affairs, much to the latter’s irritation. On 24 March Brockway suggested that the
introduction of the revised constitution should be postponed, while Bottomley warned of the
consequences if Guiana’s warring parties were not reconciled. Sandys responded: ‘The
outlook is not very rosy but I do not think there is anything further that I can do at this
stage.’lvii
While the Party’s liberationists attempted to establish the basis for a reversal of Sandys’s
policies, the Atlanticists on Labour’s revisionist wing were preoccupied with the
consequences of Guianese policy for relations with Washington. As Black has explained, in
the 1950s and 1960s the zealous anti-communism of Ernest Bevin was taken up by younger
revisionists and modified further by an increasing sense of admiration and loyalty to the
United States.lviii Any slight ebbing in Cold War commitments caused by distaste for Sandys’
methods was counter-balanced by a desire to propitiate two Democratic Presidents who had
registered Guiana as a foreign policy priority. Despite misgivings about the constitutional
manipulations of the Conservatives, the shadow Cabinet were conscious that a reversal of the
Sandys reforms would infuriate the Johnson administration. During a visit to Washington in
February 1964 the Atlanticist and revisionist Labour politician, Patrick Gordon Walker, in his
capacity as shadow Foreign Secretary, explained that the application of the Israeli system to
Guiana ‘makes the entire system into one constituency’ and signalled that this was
unappealing to mainstream Labour opinion. However, he offered reassurance that Labour
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was eager ‘find a way to give independence to British Guiana without affronting or injuring
the US’ and even suggested that they would not object ‘if a way could be found for the US to
put troops into BG.’lix During a trip to Washington two months later, Bevin’s acolyte
Christopher Mayhew rehearsed the differences in the party about Guianese affairs for the
benefit of State Department officials. He began by forecasting that ‘there might be a real
dispute in a future Labor government regarding policy towards British Guiana’ and then
explained that ‘Gordon-Walker would accentuate the important of Anglo-American
relations... whereas Bottomley would emphasise the traditional Labor policy of bringing
colonies to independence as rapidly as possible under the chosen national leaders.’lx
One of the reasons for the Bottomley faction’s eventual capitulation was the revival of the old
accusation, which had first been propagated by Gaitskellites and the TUC leadership in 1953,
that Jagan’s policies on industrial relations marked him out as a potential future dictator. In
July 1963 Bottomley spoke to Brindley Benn of the People’s Progressive Party about Jagan’s
efforts to introduce new trade union laws. He explained that he ‘was under strong pressure
from the unions and from members of the party who, rightly or wrongly, regarded the Bill as
evidence that Jagan’s was a tyrannical government intent on breaking the unions.’ Later in
the year, when Jagan attempted to persuade the Fabian Colonial Bureau to oppose the
introduction of proportional representation, he found his credibility challenged by his old
adversary, Rita Hinden. She endorsed the Sandys plan in a letter to The Times which stated: ‘I
have watched the record of the Jagan party ever since I was in British Guiana as a member of
the Constitutional Commission and no longer have faith that its leadership will respect a
democratic constitution which does not suit their book. On the other hand the democratic
elements in British Guiana have struggled consistently against authoritarian measures. We
owe them an opportunity now and it is difficult to think of any way of protecting their rights
other than what the British Government has now proposed.’lxi Jagan, who had once placed
confidence in Hinden as a conduit for the dissemination of PPP literature in the metropolis,
complained to the FCB that the views of their former colleague were ‘disgraceful’. Jagan was
increasingly dependent on the MPs aligned to the MCF to present the case against
proportional representation in the imperial metropolis.lxii
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It was the appointment of a former chairman of the MCF, Anthony Greenwood, as the new
Colonial Secretary in the Labour Cabinet, as well as Wilson’s past associations with the
Labour left, which fostered some vestigial hope within the PPP that ‘it was just possible that
the British Labour Government might have reversed Sandys’ decision.’lxiii What Jagan
discovered was that the Atlanticists were fully in the ascendant on issues of foreign,
commonwealth and colonial affairs. From the outset Greenwood found himself outmatched
by Gordon Walker. As Jagan rushed to secure an early meeting with Wilson, Gordon Walker
flew to Washington where he promised the American Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, that the
new British government ‘intended to go ahead with the British Guiana elections.’ Meanwhile
Jagan’s potential allies disabused him of the belief that Labour would radically change the
course set by Sandys in Guiana. Bottomley, in his new role of Commonwealth Secretary,
talked to Jagan during the Zambian independence celebrations in Lusaka and explained that,
despite his own earlier criticisms of Conservative policy, ‘a Labour Government could not
be expected to retrace the steps which had been taken.’lxiv Wilson was keen on a post-
electoral grand coalition between the Guianese parties and pressed this notion very hard when
he met a despairing Jagan on 29 October. His counter-factual suggestion that, if Labour had
won an election in June there might have been time to alter course, was cold comfort to Jagan
who responded by making clear that the depth of American hostility to his party precluded
any form of post-electoral alliance between the PPP and PNC. His assertion that the
American government would ‘do anything’ to keep the PPP out of power was wholly
justified. On 9 November Gordon Walker informed Wilson that Rusk was opposed both to
the continuation of a PPP government and to the establishment of multi-party governing
coalition containing Jagan. Rather than revise the Sandys electoral system, Wilson placed his
hopes on the possibility that a Commonwealth mission might achieve some rapprochement
between the Guianese parties.lxv
The decision not to cancel the elections led to a party split along the expected lines. In his
new capacity as Colonial Secretary Greenwood was obliged to explain to his former allies in
the MCF why Wilson’s government was pursuing a policy of continuity with the
Conservatives. Ian Mikardo and Bob Edwards responded by reminding Greenwood that the
Labour Party had ‘strenuously opposed’ the Sandys formula. His response mixed normative
arguments, that a reversal of policy now would constitute ‘a breach of faith’ with Burnham
and D’Aguiar, with pragmatic considerations, the most significant of which was that any
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announcement cancelling the elections would require the deployment of British troops to
Georgetown. Although Greenwood no doubt felt uncomfortable in pursuing a policy which
alienated his old allies on the liberationist wing of the party, he was cognisant of the strong
anti-Jagan sentiment of British trade unions who endorsed the Labour government’s decision
to implement Sandys’ electoral reforms. On 17 November, Hargreaves, Hood and Nicholson
of the TUC’s International Department, met Greenwood and his officials. Despite their own
irritation at the role of the American unions and the contrary evidence of the Willis
mediation, they reiterated the line which had been taken since 1953 that ‘the root of the
British Guiana problem was the incompetence of Dr. Jagan’s ministers.’ According to the
Colonial Office record of the meeting they even went as far as to declare ‘that British Guiana
needed a period of stable, right-wing government and were inclined to think that Burnham
might provide it.’ This showed a remarkable lack of prescience but at the time what most
impressed the Permanent Under-Secretary, Hilton Poynton, was the evidence of lingering
bitterness regarding Jagan’s attempts to reform Guianese industrial relations. He commented
on the minute: ‘Yes, very illuminating. The Labour Bill still rankles I suspect.’lxvi
It was fortunate for Wilson that the PPP failed to win an absolute majority in the December
elections because any other result would have generated a crisis in Washington during his
talks with Johnson. Instead, the way was cleared for Burnham’s PNC to form a post-electoral
coalition with the United Force. After the elections Labour’s Atlanticists remained conscious
of the obsessive interest shown by American policymakers in Guianese affairs. Initially
Wilson insisted Burnham should serve an extended probationary period as Chief Minister
before independence. A draft Colonial Office telegram to Georgetown composed in January
1965 even envisaged the possibility that Burnham’s coalition with the United Force might
split before independence was achieved and force the PNC to share power with the PPP.
Gordon Walker spotted this danger to transatlantic harmony and demanded that Greenwood
change the text. By this stage Wilson seemed increasingly resentful, or ‘not happy’ as the
records put it, about the constant friction between liberationists and Atlanticists regarding
Guianese affairs. The notion of a coalition between the PPP and the PNC had been precisely
the outcome Wilson had envisaged during his meeting with Jagan but it would never be
countenanced by Washington. A revised text was composed which acknowledged the
possibility that the current government might collapse but instructed the Governor not to
‘stimulate’ the idea of a Jagan-Burnham coalition. The extant PNC-UF government survived
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and, with backing from the United States, Burnham was able to force the pace of
independence during the course of 1965. Guianese affairs continued to elicit the occasional
grumble from the former Bevanite rebel and now Prime Minister. In April it was agreed that
Burnham should be granted authority to call a state of emergency. It was decided by the
Colonial Office that it would be undiplomatic to remind Burnham ‘that the emergency
powers would have to be withdrawn from him if he abused them.’ Wilson commented:
‘Reluctantly I agree, we’ve been on the run ever since the constitution was fiddled. If
Burnham is the angel he’s made out to be he would have agreed.’ When Guyana obtained
independence from Britain in May 1966, Burnham was still Chief Minister. Jagan remained
out of office for nearly three decades. Obtaining this outcome had helped establish the Cold
War credentials of Wilson’s Labour government and this was not to be jeopardised by
criticisms of American manipulation. As Gordon Walker explained: ‘Co-operation with the
United States on British Guiana is absolutely essential to good relations.’lxvii
CONCLUSIONS
The extent of trade union involvement in Guianese decolonisation calls for some
reconsideration both of the links between domestic politics and late imperial policymaking on
the British left and the significance of transnational labour movements in shaping the end of
empire. After their victory at the British polls on 15 October 1964, Wilson’s Labour
government pressed ahead with the Guianese elections which had been announced on 25
September and were scheduled for 7 December. This decision represented an endorsement of
Sandys’s plan to oust Jagan. It was also a triumph for the Atlanticists in the Party whose
priority was pacifying critics of the PPP in Washington. In many respects it replicated the
decision taken by the Attlee-led party ten years earlier to offer at least partial endorsement to
the ousting of the first elected PPP government. At that time, and even without an American
president to prod them, Labour’s leaders reacted in a surprisingly complaisant fashion as
Lyttelton removed the newly elected government in a display of unvarnished imperial force.
As far as the Gaitskellites were concerned Jagan’s cultivation of and by the WFTU, the
Bevanites and the British Communist Party sealed his fate. To that extent, the end of empire
in Guiana offers validation for Whiting’s argument that decolonisation was marked by
consensus and that the leaders of the two major parties found more in common with one
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another than with right- or left-wing radicals in their own parties.lxviii What has not been
acknowledged is the extent to which the pull towards centre ground in the Labour Party was a
consequence of the anti-communism in the British trade union movement. When liberationist
impulse collided with Cold War exigencies the metropolitan labour movement prioritised the
ongoing conflict with international communism, although in the case of British Guiana these
calculations proved wholly unreliable. After independence Burnham established one of the
most authoritarian and corrupt regimes in the Americas. He also confounded the expectation
of Britain’s Labour revisionists and the Democratic Presidents of the United States by
establishing close relations with Moscow.
Burnham’s victory was at least partially determined by the operations of a transnational
network of labour institutions which in many respects mirrored more traditional forms of
western imperialism. Nascent colonial unions were forced to choose between the ICFTU and
the WFTU. Once evidence emerged that Jagan favoured the WFTU, his activities came under
scrutiny by the British TUC. Vincent Tewson, Arthur Deakin and Frank Cousins all had their
say about affairs in Guiana and what they said was that Jagan must be kept out of power even
if this meant endorsing Conservative policy. Wider ideological affinities which stretched
across frontiers were also at work, such as those between the Movement for Colonial
Freedom and the PPP or between the AFL-CIO and the MPCA. The form of liberationism
espoused by the Jagan in the periphery demanded the fusion of political and industrial
relations struggles: the goal of economic justice for the labour force necessitated the
acquisition of influence in the executive and legislative branches of the colonial government,
while the support of the workers was essential if the nationalist goal of independence was to
be obtained. This kind of analysis was persuasive to many members of the MCF but the
fragile alliance they established with the PPP was thoroughly outmatched by the range of
support which the MPCA could marshal. The success of the Guianese MPCA in securing
recognition and funding from the ICFTU, AFL-CIO and, with some degree of hesitation and
ambivalence, the British TUC enabled them to play a decisive role in destabilising Jagan’s
government. To that extent the conflict between the MPCA and its Jaganite rivals in the trade
union movement was a proxy for divisions within the global labour movement. What is clear
from the Guyanese case is that bilateral relations between colonial and metropolitan labour
movements cannot be studied in isolation from these wider ideological and institutional
24
currents. And in this instance Cold War considerations trumped the anticolonial cause to
which the British left was ostensibly committed.
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